

**PREPARED STATEMENT OF SECRETARY BILL RICHARDSON
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
BEFORE THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
MARCH 16, 1999**

OPENING REMARKS

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Department of Energy's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2000.

I want to start off by telling you how much I appreciate the support this Committee has demonstrated for the Department's national security missions. This not only enables us to do our work, but offers the critical bolstering we need to tackle such critical assignments.

I take our national missions very seriously. I've made some difficult decisions since I arrived at the Department:

- On tritium production;
- On our new efforts to foil emerging threats to our national security; and
- On working with Russia to ensure that rightsizing their nuclear complex goes as safely and securely as possible.

And this year, I will make many more tough decisions. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I seek your guidance on how we can make these upcoming decisions pay the best dividends for America and how we can make the Department of Energy one of America's best cabinet agencies

THE DEPARTMENT'S MISSIONS

This budget increase will help the Department fulfill its national security missions. These are:

- Keeping our nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and reliable, in the absence of underground testing;
- Cleaning up the environmental legacy of the Cold War, and establishing a national integrated waste strategy to clean up our sites; and
- Reducing the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction.

We are requesting \$12.184 billion for the Department's national security missions.

\$4.5 billion of this request will go to our stockpile stewardship program. This effort uses lab experimentation, high speed computer simulation, and decades of Department specialists' expertise to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of America's nuclear deterrent -- without nuclear testing.

It is this important program that enables us to enter into a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty -- which is one of President Clinton's top priorities. We look forward to achieving ratification of this important treaty this year.

Stockpile Stewardship

Nuclear weapons form the steady cornerstone of our national defense policy. While it has been nearly 10 years since we have manufactured a new nuclear weapon and nearly seven years since the last underground nuclear test, our confidence in the safety and reliability of our current nuclear weapons stockpile remains high. We are confident because stockpile stewardship is working: last December, Secretary of Defense Cohen and I certified to the President -- for the third consecutive year -- that there is no need to conduct underground nuclear tests at this time.

We have laid out a plan addressing the tasks required to maintain the stockpile over the next ten years and beyond. The Department of Energy and the Department of Defense agree on this plan - and the Administration has committed to fund this program and all its parts.

When the President committed to seeking a true zero yield test ban, he stated that our adherence to a test ban would be conditioned upon six safeguards. The first of those safeguards requires the conduct of a stockpile stewardship program, and the maintenance of a vibrant scientific and technical base in our laboratories to carry out that program. History demonstrates that great labs demand great missions, and that America is adept at tapping into these resources for the betterment of our nation.

Today, the enthusiasm and vigor evident at the Department's national laboratories proves that Stockpile Stewardship is also such a critical mission. It attracts the best minds, and the kinds of people driven to solve tough problems of national importance. People who want to do their part to make sure America is safe and secure in increasingly volatile times.

Let me give you some examples of how Stockpile Stewardship Program is working now.

- We have modified the B61 bomb, which replaces the outmoded B53 bomb in the stockpile.
- Using new stewardship tools, we have solved problems that, in the past, would likely have required nuclear testing.
- We have conducted literally hundreds of experiments on existing facilities that are increasing our understanding of nuclear weapons. And

\$ We have produced numerous parts, on time, while continuing to downsize the complex.

Later this year we will begin using the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) facility at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. This facility will provide additional information on the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile.

In addition, we continue to safely dismantle nuclear weapons excess to the stockpile, with 11,000 disassembled since 1991. This work is allowing America to stay true to its international promises: dismantlements stemming from the nation's response to START I will essentially be completed by FY 2001.

And today, under the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI), we are employing computers which are 1,000 times more powerful than those available in our laboratories just six years ago. This program, in cooperation with industry, is on-track to design and build supercomputers reaching 100 trillion operations per second by 2004. These advanced supercomputers are needed to complete the shift from nuclear test-based methods to science-based methods and to assess and certify the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile without conducting underground nuclear testing.

Now I want to address one of our decisions that I know is of great interest to you: our decision on tritium production.

As you know, In December 1998, I announced a decision to use Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) reactors as the primary source of tritium production. At that time, I designated TVA's Watts Bar and Sequoyah reactors as the preferred facilities. The linear accelerator was designated as the back up technology and we will therefore complete only its engineering development and demonstration program and preliminary design.

The use of existing TVA reactors was preferred because:

- they offer the nation a proven technology;
- they offer the best deal for taxpayers; and
- they offer the most flexibility for meeting our present and future tritium requirements.

I am pleased to announce that we have come to an agreement with TVA on price. We are working on the technical details, which we hope to resolve shortly. Once again, this is a great deal for taxpayers, it's a fair deal for TVA ratepayers, and it's the cheapest option for tritium production by any measure.

These components form a consistent, comprehensive response to our national arms reduction goals. An interagency agreement with TVA under the Economy Act -- which outlines an as-needed, pay-as-you-go, actual-cost@basis B will result in operating costs being as low as possible for the production of tritium. And as many of you know, tritium has not been produced

in the U.S. since 1988, and since it decays fairly rapidly, defense requirements have been met by recycling material from dismantled weapons.

The tritium gas will be extracted from the rods at the Tritium Extraction Facility to be constructed in FY 2000 at the Savannah River Site.

Secretary of Defense Cohen has publicly endorsed the Department's decision on tritium, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Jackson has made a commitment to expeditiously review requests for regulatory approvals. I look forward to discussing this important program with you, and welcome your input.

In other Departmental facility developments, progress on the National Ignition Facility (NIF) continues on-schedule and within the \$1.2 billion budget. The NIF will be the world's largest laser and will be able to provide a window into weapon physics at temperatures and densities close to those occurring in actual nuclear weapons detonation. The first NIF experiments are slated to begin in October 2001, using 8 of 192 laser beams.

And pit production capability is being reestablished at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, a capability the Department has not had since the 1989 closure of the Rocky Flats Plant. A W88 first development unit pit was successfully produced last year, and the first pit for stockpile use will be produced by 2001. These new pits are required as replacements for those pits destroyed as part of the surveillance program.

Nonproliferation

I. International

1. Russian Nuclear Materials Security

Our efforts to secure nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union and the Newly Independent States are more urgent than ever. This work **B** already a top national security priority for the department and the President -- has gained gravity in the wake of the Russian economic collapse in August of last year.

Through the tremendous dedication of our Federal staff and laboratory experts, the Russian Materials Protection, Control and Accounting work has expanded into all facets of the Russian nuclear complex, including naval and military sites, civilian plants, and transportation.

Department of Energy projects are now active in 40-plus sites throughout the former Soviet Union. Through this program, we have already improved security on 400 tons of nuclear material, and completed upgrades on over 30 tons.

We are seeing results, as our efforts have resulted in Russians=increased awareness of Ainsider

threat, and trust and cooperation between us and our Russian counterparts has grown.

In the coming year, we will expand this effective program to additional sites, secure many more tons of nuclear material, and expand into the important area of materials consolidation meaning fewer sites will need protection and maintenance in the long-term.

2. Nuclear Cities Initiative / Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention

In the past few weeks, a good deal has been said and written about our Nuclear Cities Initiative and our Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention. On this point, I want to be exceedingly clear. The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, or AIPP program, is successful at its primary goal: keeping Russian weapons scientists at home and helping prevent them from aiding weapon programs in other countries. Through our efforts, we have modified the activities of institutes and experts who were formerly inclined to provide such assistance to would-be nuclear states or terrorists, and we have blocked other disconcerting activities.

I have taken a close look at the recent report prepared by the General Accounting Office. My Department cooperated extensively in the preparation of this account, and I have found that it contains a number of important and valuable recommendations. I have already begun implementing several of these proposals, including:

- a review to improve the outlook for commercialization;
- tightened review procedures to ensure against any potential benefits for Russian military activities; and
- an effort to refocus available funds so that more money reaches Russian scientists.

We have already temporarily employed thousands of scientists at about 170 institutes and organizations throughout Russia and other Newly Independent States.

The *New York Times*, in a recent editorial, said Washington should press ahead in its efforts to re-employ Russian weapons scientists in civilian work; that it is critical we continue these programs. I agree.

If we continue this work, we can expect this program will continue to reinforce our nonproliferation goals of:

- keeping Russian weapons knowhow in Russia; and
- frustrating the desires of terrorists and would be nuclear states.

But we will need your support to reach these goals. I look forward to speaking with you further on this critical national security issue.

In addition, we are continuing our efforts to bring alternative employment to the ten formerly closed nuclear cities in Russia. This process will be increasingly important if the Russian economy continues to falter and as the Russia nuclear infrastructure continues to downsize.

Earlier this year, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy announced that facilities within two key nuclear cities -- Arzamas and Penza **B** will be closed in the coming years, making the certainty of further unemployed scientists more imminent and our program to develop alternative employment even more critical. I ask for your support in this national security effort.

3. Soviet-Reactor Nuclear Safety

In this area, we will continue our vital assistance to improve the safety and security of Soviet-designed reactors, and to prevent the recurrence of disasters like Chernobyl. In May, I will travel to Ukraine to review our work on to also help expedite the pursuit of alternative energy sources **B** a contingency plan that will help ensure the continued economic security and vitality of a country that is critical to our national security.

4. Nonproliferation and Arms Control Verification Technologies

As I mentioned in discussing our stockpile stewardship activities, another top Clinton Administration priority in 1999 is the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We will continue to work with you to answer questions and obtain your advice and consent to this treaty.

While doing so, our technical work to ensure the verifiability of the CTBT will continue -- work that will elicit benefits regardless of the treaty's eventual outcome. The development of improved test identification and characterization capabilities, along with other remote capabilities to detect proliferation-related activities, are key parts of our R&D efforts within the Department.

II. Domestic

1. Chemical and Biological Threats

The risk of chemical and biological weapons attacks in the United States is growing. The Department of Energy oversees an extensive science and technology enterprise, developed over the past 50 years in support of our nuclear and energy missions. While our capabilities in the nuclear area are well known, less so is our work in the biological area. What began with studying the effects of radiation on the human body continues today with efforts to sequence DNA. These and other capabilities, joined with our national security expertise, make the Department uniquely positioned to fight the chemical and biological threat.

We are making progress in harnessing the expertise of the national laboratories to foil the emerging threats of chemical and biological-terrorism. As was displayed recently in the Rayburn building by expert William Patrick, biological agents like anthrax are insidious weapons. They can be delivered anonymously and by simple means -- such as the vial Mr. Patrick brought into Rayburn when he testified before Chairman Goss. For our national security, we must be vigilant in detecting these agents.

We are working toward this capability. The week before last, I announced a new initiative mobilizing the Department of Energy and its laboratories, mobilizing our unique scientific horsepower and infrastructure, in a comprehensive and coordinated initiative to counter these emerging threats. The Department of Energy is boosting funding to provide technology and expertise to address a pressing security need. And providing it where no one else is.

The President is leading the charge to ensure that we take all appropriate steps to ensure that we are prepared to meet and respond to this growing menace. The Department of Energy is accelerating its role in counterterrorism activities to ensure that those persons who must be first-on-the-scene of such incidents -- law enforcement, doctors, fire department -- have the technical tools they need to assess and respond to the threat. The development of portable, accurate sensors for chemical and biological agents is critical. Right now, detecting the presence of a chem-bio agent can take days with equipment that fills a room in a laboratory. Our Energy Department labs have just developed an instrument the size of a suitcase that can detect a chem-bio agent within hours by decoding its DNA. This giant leap forward essentially brings our labs into the field.

And within three years, I want our labs to develop biological agent detectors small enough to fit into the hand of a fireman or a cop that tells within seconds if a chem-bio agent is present. And what kind of agent it is, such as whether it is anthrax or a plague virus.

2. Critical Infrastructure

Another area the President has identified as needing urgent attention is protecting our nation's critical infrastructure. The things we take for granted everyday -- power and oil supply, computer systems, even drinking water -- are potential targets for terrorists. The Department of Energy serves as the lead Federal agency for coordination with the private sector to protect America's critical electric, oil and gas infrastructures. We are working aggressively to identify potential points of vulnerability, and are coordinating with other agencies to best meet **B** and resolve **B** these concerns.

Materials Disposition

As I mentioned a moment ago, given the current political instability and degenerating economic conditions prevailing in Russia, there is a very real threat that nuclear weapons materials could be stolen or diverted into the hands of terrorists or non-nuclear nations. These materials could then be used not only against other nations **B** but also to threaten America.

In addressing this threat, I am pleased to report to you that the Department has made important progress this past year toward disposing of surplus weapons plutonium. In July 1998, the United States and Russia signed a **A**Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement,**@** which provides for conducting tests and demonstrations (up to and including pilot-scale tests and demonstrations) of technologies needed to dispose of surplus weapons plutonium. At the Moscow Summit in September

1998, President Clinton and President Yeltsin signed a Joint Statement of Principles for Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes. This Statement commits our two countries to concluding a Bilateral Plutonium Disposition Agreement as soon as possible.

The Bilateral Agreement would specify:

- the technological approach and schedules for each country;
- the types of facilities to be constructed in Russia, and
- commitments with respect to the financing of these activities in Russia.

Negotiations have begun and I expect we will be able to conclude this agreement by the end of the year. At that point, we will then be able to develop a plan for the \$200 million emergency FY 1999 appropriation earmarked to implement such an agreement in Russia.

The Fiscal Year 2000 budget request for these activities is \$200 million, an increase of \$32.5 million over the Fiscal Year 1999 comparable amount. This increase is primarily for:

- conducting the necessary technology development and demonstrations;
- completing site-specific environmental analyses;
- designing three disposition facilities; and
- providing key negotiation and technical support for efforts to attain a bilateral agreement for the disposition of surplus Russian plutonium.

Counterintelligence

Now, first, I want to address an issue that I know is on many of your minds: our actions to ensure the safety and security of the information at our national laboratories.

The Energy Department's national laboratories are the world's leading facilities for national security research. As such, it is no surprise that they have long been targets of foreign intelligence services.

Recent findings show that, in the mid-1980s, during the Reagan-Bush administration, China may have obtained strategic nuclear weapons information. Whether this information advanced China's nuclear weapons program is unclear.

I cannot comment on any potential ongoing cases. But I can tell you that when the Department of Energy developed concerns in 1995 that China may have had access to sensitive nuclear information, the Department promptly brought that information to the attention of the FBI and the CIA and launched an assessment and a formal inquiry into the matter. Such inquiries into security issues take time to unfold.

I can say also that the Department of Energy is taking this matter and our overall security issues very seriously. We have been strengthening our counterintelligence capabilities and, today, strong counterintelligence measures are already in place at Department of Energy labs and we are making them even stronger.

In February of 1998, the President signed Presidential Decision Directive 61, which recognized the new threats to the Department's essential national security mission and which ordered swift and sweeping changes within the Energy Department's counterintelligence program.

Under the President's directive, an independent Office of Counterintelligence was established at the Department of Energy, an office headed by Edward J. Curran. In consultation with the top counterintelligence experts at the CIA and FBI, he has completed an exhaustive review of the counterintelligence program, and he is making major improvements to DOE's counterintelligence capabilities.

Since I came to the Department last fall, I have recognized the importance of a strong counterintelligence program and I have pushed to make ours better. I met with the directors of our national laboratories to discuss our counterintelligence plan and how we will implement it. I hired a veteran of the CIA to direct our Office of Intelligence. And I created a new position in my executive office for a senior advisor on counterintelligence.

And we've already made several important reforms. We've deployed counterintelligence professionals on-site at our weapons labs. We doubled the counterintelligence budget in fiscal 1999 to \$15 million and we are requesting the Congress's support to double the budget again for the year 2000. We've changed the screening and the approval process for foreign scientists seeking access to DOE labs and have made the lab directors directly accountable for foreign visits. We've tightened security checks and reviews -- including the use of polygraphs -- for Department of Energy scientists working in sensitive programs. And we've raised the profile and power of the Office of Counterintelligence.

The director, Ed Curran, now reports directly to me. And the counterintelligence experts at the labs report directly to the director at the lab and the office of Counterintelligence here in Washington. This simple chain of command provides quick, easy and direct access for raising concerns about any potential breaches of our national security.

The Department of Energy is responsible for highly advanced research and development activities. It has always been attractive to foreign intelligence agencies, and it always will be.

But by improving our security and increasing our accountability we can better protect our vital national security capabilities at DOE labs now and in the future. By so doing, we are also protecting the national interest of the United States and the American people.

Naval Reactors

The Naval Reactors Program (NR) continues its unsurpassed record of excellence. Responsible for all aspects of reactors in the Navy's warships, this program has a 45-year record of safe, environmentally sound performance -- over 115 million miles steamed on nuclear power, a total of 5,000 reactor years of operation. Moreover, these reactors must operate reliably under extreme conditions at sea. An example is operating under the Arctic ice pack -- a situation allowing no margin for error or loss of power.

Today, Naval Reactors is responsible for 107 reactors, more than the number of commercial power reactors in the U. S., and almost as many as in the next two largest commercial nuclear power producing countries -- France and Japan -- combined. While ensuring the safety and reliability of the many operating plants, this program is also developing new reactors to meet the Navy's needs. Naval Reactors is currently deep into developing the ANext Generation Reactor,@ which is on-schedule and meeting all technical objectives, for the new VIRGINIA Class attack submarines.

The Program is also getting started on developing a reactor for the Navy's new class of aircraft carriers, called the ACVNX@-- a major long-term undertaking.

To give you some perspective of the long-range responsibilities of the Naval Reactors program, let me illustrate that some of the reactor designs in nuclear powered warships currently at sea or authorized will still be in use into the middle of the next century. Today, the reactors in the USS ENTERPRISE -- the first nuclear powered aircraft carrier -- have operated longer than any Naval reactors, over 37 years. Upon retirement in about 2013, the ENTERPRISE will have operated longer than any steel hulled warship in the Navy's history -- 52 years. There is a challenge to keeping reactors subjected to extreme conditions operating reliably that long.

The Naval Reactors program is also responsible for dealing with decommissioned reactors. On the Navy side, NR is actively disposing of reactors from decommissioned ships at the rate of about six per year, with full environmental compliance. On the Energy Department side, the Department is inactivating six shutdown prototype reactor plants. This effort is well along, and at the end of this year, all the reactors will have been defueled, and one will be completely dismantled by the end of FY2000.

A longer range concern is funding the CVNX aircraft carrier reactor development for FY 2002 and beyond. The Navy's current "workhorse" reactor for aircraft carriers is a 30-year-old design B which will have been in use for nearly 100 years when the last NIMITZ Class carrier is retired. The time has come to carry through on a new design.

Environmental Management

The Department of Energy budget request includes \$5.7 billion in traditional budget authority for Environmental Management, plus \$228 million to support privatization projects continuing the cleanup of our nuclear facilities.

This request provides funding for the EM Program for Fiscal Year 2000 at a level that will continue progress toward the aggressive goals we have set for safely and efficiently cleaning up our sites. Our goal is to complete cleanup of most sites by 2006, including closing Rocky Flats in Colorado, and the Mound and Fernald Sites in Ohio. This work will not only reduce the hazards presently facing our workforce and the public, but also substantially reduce overhead costs in site security, facility operations, personnel, and safety.

During this past year, the Department has made tremendous progress in cleaning up sites. For example, in FY 1998, we finished cleanup of an entire class of nuclear waste sites -- known as uranium mill tailings sites. Except for remaining ground water contamination, we completed cleanup of 22 large uranium mill tailings sites as well as 5,300 vicinity properties -- including elementary schools and homes. This \$1.5 billion project, authorized in 1978, included remediation of over 40 million cubic yards of contaminated soil and material.

At this time last year, we had 53 sites requiring active cleanup. Having completed cleanup at three sites, plus transferring another two uranium mill tailings sites to the State of North Dakota at its request, that number is now reduced to 48, and we will decrease that number further by completing cleanup of six more sites by the end of FY 2000.

We are also making progress at our larger sites, where cleanup will continue well beyond 2006. For example, we completed deactivation of the A-N-Reactor in FY 1998, the last of nine production reactors at the Hanford Site in Washington. This involved deactivation of 86 facilities and removal of 33 grouted monoliths containing most of N-Reactor's high-dose materials. Also at Hanford, we completed the deactivation of the B-Plant. Deactivating these facilities reduced annual overhead costs from about \$20 million to \$500,000 for the N-Reactor, and from \$19 million to \$1 million a year for the B-Plant.

And in May of 1998, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency certified the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal of radioactive waste. The Department has since declared WIPP ready to begin operations, if pending litigation is resolved favorably. We expect to begin shipments of transuranic waste to WIPP later this year, a crucial step forward in providing for the permanent disposal of a portion of the Department's long-lived radioactive waste. The FY 2000 budget reflects our intent to increase the number of shipments to WIPP in FY 2000.

We have also made considerable success in moving toward a truly performance-based management

system in the Environmental Management program. Last year, we established a new budget structure aligned with our vision of cleanup completion. The majority of our work has been organized into projects with defined endpoints, schedules and costs. Reflecting the support we received last year from Congress for these changes, we have built our budget at the project-level in the FY 2000 request, allowing the Department to track progress at the project level.

Critical to our success in closing sites and accelerating our work is deriving the best use of the unique capabilities at the sites. We have begun an integration initiative to identify opportunities to consolidate treatment, storage and disposal facilities where it makes good sense; apply innovative technologies at multiple sites; eliminate redundant facilities and use available capacity rather than construct new facilities; and apply lessons-learned and site successes complex-wide.

For example, one action that is complete is where we shipped plutonium weapons components from the Rocky Flats Site to the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico or the Pantex Plant in Texas. This consolidation allows the Department to now greatly improve the cost-effectiveness of its security for the remaining plutonium materials at the Rocky Flats Site. The Department needs world-class technologies to address cleanups complex environmental challenges -- and to do so both quickly and cost-efficiently. In FY 1998, innovative technology was used in approximately 120 cleanup projects. Another 42 alternative technologies were ready for use, and many other technologies are in the late stages of development and will be ready in time to support our accelerated cleanup schedule.

We have extended the role of the environmental management science and technology program to provide the full range of science and technology resources and capabilities needed to deliver and support fully-developed, deployable solutions to the Department of Energy's cleanup and long-term environmental stewardship problems. From basic research through development, demonstration, deployment and technical assistance, this program will now be able to cover a wide range of initiatives.

Worker Transition

Our Worker and Community Transition program budget request for FY 2000 is \$30 million. This request will allow the Department to:

- facilitate earlier site closure; and
- promote reindustrialization of excess facilities that can result in significant long term savings.

The program will assist in economic development and reuse of facilities such as:

- the Mound facility in Ohio;
- the gaseous diffusion plants in Portsmouth, Ohio and Paducah, Kentucky;
- the Hanford facility in Washington State; and
- the East Tennessee Technology Park in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

It also funds incentives to encourage voluntary separation and to assist workers in moving to new careers when work force restructuring is required. The program assists in implementing more

efficient contracting mechanisms, while utilizing the skills of the existing work force. At Oak Ridge, these strategies helped avoid immediate severance liabilities of up to \$45 million.

I became aware of this program when I was a member of Congress representing the 3rd District of New Mexico -- which includes the Department of Energy's Los Alamos National Laboratory. I was impressed with how this program was able to work with the local community to develop a cooperative agreement designed to mitigate the impacts of workforce restructuring at the lab. Back in New Mexico, the efforts of the worker and community transition program have resulted in 235 jobs having been created or retained by the local community reuse organization -- the Regional Development Corporation (or, ARDC®). The RDC has since initiated several promising projects including one with Santa Fe Community College, which is working to serve displaced ex-Los Alamos workers and contribute to regional economic development.

CONCLUSION

In summation, I would like to state for the record that the Department of Energy's proposed budget for FY 2000 will provide our scientists and engineers with the tools, facilities and talented personnel necessary to keep our nation safe and secure into the new millennium. With this Committee's continued support, the Department of Energy will produce the science, security and energy to power this nation in the 21st Century.